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NO MORE EXCUSES: CLOSING THE DOOR
ON THE VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION
DEFENSE
CHAD J. LAYTON*

INTRODUCTION
An intoxicated man deliberately set two fires in the apartment where he, his ex-wife, and his children lived. The court
found the defendant not guilty of second degree arson because he
lacked the specific intent to damage the building. The court's application of the voluntary' intoxication 2 defense excused the defendant from full criminal responsibility for his actions. Although
courts generally presume that defendants intend for the natural
and probable consequences of their actions,3 the court in this case
failed to explain how a defendant could intentionally start a fire to
a building but not intend to damage that building. In order to justify its decision, the court simply asserted that the defendant was
drunk." The court's failure to reasonably explain its holding leaves
one who reads its opinion with the sour taste of injustice.
The defense of voluntary intoxication enables defendants to

* J.D. Candidate, 1997.
1. Eugene R. Milhizer, Voluntary Intoxication as a Criminal Defense Under Military Law, 127 MIL. L. REV. 131, 135 (1990). Intoxication is voluntary
when an actor, knowingly and without force or fraud, introduces an intoxicant
into his body. Id.
2. Id. at 143 (explaining that legal intoxication occurs when a person consumes intoxicating liquors or drugs and is subsequently unable to formulate a
specific criminal intent). See also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.04 (West 1993)
(defining intoxication as a "disturbance of mental or physical capacity resulting from the introduction of any substance into the body."); Frederick P.
Hafetz, Alcoholism and DrugAddiction: The Effect on Mens Rea, in CRIMINAL
LAW & URBAN PROBLEMS 1985, at 1 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 140, 1985) (explaining how intoxicants affect individuals). Alcohol reduces an individual's ability to control his behavior. Id. Narcotics, as well as alcohol, interfere with a person's ability to function as a
normal member of society. Id.
3. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL
LAW § 28, at 203 (1972) (explaining that the foreseeable result of a defendant's
act is relevant when a jury is determining the defendant's mental state).
4. This illustration is based on an actual case, New York v. Tocco, 525
N.Y.S.2d 137, 137-43 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988). See infra notes 134-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of the problems associated with the Tocco case.
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avoid full criminal culpability for their actions.' People are fully
aware that intoxication impairs their ability to control their actions and think reasonably. In light of this fact, society must no
longer allow criminal actors7 to defend their actions by asserting
that they voluntarily became intoxicated.8
Early common law courts rejected voluntary intoxication as a
criminal defense.9 Some common law courts provided that voluntary intoxication should not mitigate a crime's punishment, but
rather aggravate it. ° However, this rigid common law rule trou5. Hafetz, supra note 2, at 2. When intoxication renders a defendant incapable of formulating a requisite intent, the result is rarely an acquittal and
the jury will often convict the defendant of a lesser crime. Id. See, e.g., Kemp
v. Government of Canal Zone, 167 F.2d 938, 942 (5th Cir. 1948) (reducing the
sentence of an intoxicated defendant from the death penalty to life in prison);
Massachusetts v. Costello, 467 N.E.2d 811, 819 (Mass. 1984) (stating that voluntary intoxication can lessen a charge of first degree murder to second degree murder); Oregon v. Thayer, 573 P.2d 758, 759 (Or. Ct. App. 1978)
(finding that when there is sufficient evidence of intoxication, a jury may find
a defendant innocent of a greater offense, like murder, but guilty of a lesser
criminal offense, for example first degree manslaughter).
6. South Carolina v. Vaughn, 232 S.E.2d 328, 331 (S.C. 1977). See also
Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013, 2021 (1996) (noting studies recognizing
that intoxicated persons may act violently because they believe that intoxicated persons are supposed to act violently).
7. For the purposes of this Comment, the term "criminal actor" describes
a person who has committed an act for which the law prescribes a penalty or
punishment. However, that person does not necessarily have the requisite
mental state for a court to hold him criminally liable.
8. New York v. Register, 457 N.E.2d 704, 709 (N.Y. 1983) (stating that a
rule that exonerates a person who voluntarily drinks and fails to foresee what
will result from his actions if he becomes drunk serves no penological or social
purpose).
9. Timothy P. ONeill, Illinois' Latest Version of the Defense of Voluntary
Intoxication: Is it Wise? Is it Constitutional?,39 DEPAUL L. REV. 15, 17 (1989).
See also HASCAL BRILL, CYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINAL LAW 2328 (1922)

(explaining that in England, the ecclesiastical courts considered drunkenness
to be an offense against God and the Christian religion); JOHN G. HAWLEY &
MALCOLM MCGREGOR, CRIMINAL LAW 21 (1915) ("It is wrong for a man to get
drunk."). At one point the United States Constitution, in a fruitless effort to
curb drunkenness, outlawed the sale, manufacture, and transportation of intoxicating liquor. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend.

XXI. Despite the societal aversion to drunkenness, some states allow a defendant to partially avoid criminal responsibility if that defendant was severely
intoxicated during the commission of his crime. See infra notes 26-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of jurisdictions that allow voluntary intoxication as a criminal defense.
10. O'Neill, supra note 9, at 17-18. See also Illionis v. Rosas, 429 N.E.2d
898, 900 (I1. App. Ct. 1981) (explaining that early common law authorities
provided that intoxication would aggravate a criminal offense). Early courts
did not allow voluntary intoxication as a defense because common law courts
recognized that a defendant could feign intoxication too easily. Id. In Rosas,
the Illinois Appellate Court explained that today, courts must hold a person
responsible for the consequences of his actions when that person voluntarily
chooses to unbind himself from the constraints of conscience and reason. Id.
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bled many judges and thus, early nineteenth century courts designed a new approach." These courts wanted to find a compromise between their conflicting feelings of reprobation and sympathy for drunken criminal actors. 12 As a result, nineteenth century
common law courts developed the theory that intoxication could
negate a criminal actors intent for a crime of which intent is an
element. 8
Most modem jurisdictions agree that voluntary intoxication is
not an excuse for criminal conduct." In some jurisdictions, however, if an intoxicated defendant is unable to form the requisite
mens rea,6 the defendant is not criminally culpable. 6 Pragmati-

11. See California v. Hood, 462 P.2d 370, 377 (Cal. 1969) (explaining the
historical development of the defense of voluntary intoxication).
12. Id. English and American courts distinguished between specific and
general intent crimes in order to compromise and allow criminal actors to use
the defense of voluntary intoxication in some circumstances but not others.
Id.
13. Id. The Hood court explained that nineteenth century judges recognized that the moral culpability of an intoxicated offender was generally less
than that of a sober criminal. Id. Common law judges also felt, however, that
if a person deliberately becomes intoxicated and commits a crime, that person
should not escape criminal liability for the consequences of his actions. Id.
See also Hobgood v. Housewright, 698 F.2d 962, 963 (8th Cir. 1983) (stating
that voluntary intoxication is an affirmative defense that negates the existence of a requisite element of the crime); Pennsylvania v. Rumsey, 454 A.2d
1121, 1122 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (recognizing that voluntary intoxication can
render a criminal actor incapable of formulating some types of mens rea). A
defendant cannot offer evidence of intoxication to completely exonerate himself of criminal responsibility, and voluntary intoxication is never an excuse
for a crime. Id.
14. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Vaughn, 232 S.E.2d 328, 330 (1977)
(asserting that voluntary intoxication is never an excuse for criminal activity).
See also Scott A. Anderegg, Note, The Voluntary Intoxication Defense in Iowa,
73 IOwA L. REV. 935, 950 (1988) (discussing two different interpretations to
the assertion that voluntary intoxication is not an excuse for a crime). On one
hand, the assertion that voluntary intoxication is not an excuse for criminal
conduct can mean that a defendant cannot assert the voluntary intoxication
defense for any criminal offense. Id. On the other hand, jurisdictions that do
not allow intoxication as an excuse may assert that intoxication is not a complete defense and will not totally absolve a person of criminal responsibility.
Id. Jurisdictions that do not allow defendants to assert voluntary intoxication
as a defense use the former interpretation of the assertion, while jurisdictions
that do allow some form of the defense use the latter. Id.
15. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 985 (6th ed. 1990) (defining mens rea as a
wrongful purpose, a guilty mind, or a criminal intent) [hereinafter BLACK'S].
16. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 3, § 28, at 201. With the exception of
strict liability statutes, a mens rea is required for a court to fird a defendant
criminally liable. Id. See also JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP J.U.D., BISHOP ON
CRIMINAL LAW 265-66 n.2 (1923) (explaining that a criminal must have sufficient intellectual capacity to have a criminal purpose). If a defendant's mental power and reason are deficient such that he has no conscience, will, or controlling mental power, a court cannot punish that defendant for his criminal
acts as that defendant is not a responsible moral agent. Id. See generally
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cally speaking, however, this theory has created more problems
than it has solved. 7
Courts today have problems creating a workable doctrine that
they can consistently apply to cases involving intoxicated offenders.1" Jurisdictions that allow the voluntary intoxication defense
ignore important goals behind the criminal law, including that of
holding defendants personally accountable for their criminal acts.19
In addition, the incongruities that accompany the defense of voluntary intoxication upset one's sense of justice thereby threatening
the confidence that people have in our nation's tribunals.20
This Comment examines the problems inherent with the defense of voluntary intoxication. Part I explores several approaches
that different jurisdictions take to the defense. Part II establishes
that jurisdictions that abolish the voluntary intoxication defense
do not violate a defendant's constitutional rights of due process.
Part III analyzes the rationale that supports jurisdictions that
disallow voluntary intoxication as an affirmative defense. Part IV
proposes that states must abolish voluntary intoxication as an affirmative defense.
A LAND OF CONFUSION: THE DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO THE
VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION DEFENSE
Since its creation in the common law, courts have reworked,
rewritten, and refashioned the voluntary intoxication defense. 2'
I.

INGO KEILITZ & JuNrus P. FULTON, THE INSANITY DEFENSE AND ITS ALTERNATIVES: A GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS 5 (1984) (asserting that it is morally

unacceptable to punish a person who is blameless because penalizing the
blameless lends little to the purposes of punishing people for their actions).
The purposes of punishing defendants include rehabilitation, protection of the
public, retribution, and deterrence. Id. Imprisonment does not provide a deterrent for a person who cannot conform his behavior to the law. Id. If a person is not able to tell the difference between right and wrong, the deterrence

function of the criminal law is not effective because that person is
"undeterrable." Id.

17. See infra notes 97-180 and accompanying text for a discussion of some
of the problems that states face in allowing the voluntary intoxication defense.
18. See infra notes 114-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
problems that courts face with a specific approach to the voluntary intoxication defense.
19. See infra notes 55-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of the importance of personal responsibility in the criminal law.
20. See infra notes 164-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of a case
where the court failed to adequately explain why it partially absolved a defendant of criminal responsibility.
21. See California v. Hood, 462 P.2d 370, 377 (Cal. 1969) (explaining that
common law courts created a distinction between general intent and specific
intent crimes to respond to the problems involved with drunken criminal actors). Today, however, there are a number of different approaches that jurisdictions take to the voluntary intoxication defense. See infra notes 26-50 and
accompanying text for a discussion of various approaches that states take to

the voluntary intoxication defense.
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Today, state courts administer a variety of different approaches to
the defense." Jurisdictions that allow the defense base their approach on the theory that a defendant is not guilty of a crime
without the requisite mens rea.22 In practice, however, jurisdictions generally do not agree on exactly how to design the defense.2
A handful of states refuse to allow any form of the defense of voluntary intoxication in adherence to the criminal law policy of
holding defendants fully accountable for their actions.25
A

A Potpourriof Possibilities:Different Approaches that States
Take to the Voluntary Intoxication Defense

There are different approaches that jurisdictions take to the
voluntary intoxication defense. 2' For example, Kentucky law pro-

22. See generally 1 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 65, at
286-300 (1984) (discussing six approaches that American jurisdictions take to
the defense of voluntary intoxication). Some jurisdictions allow the defense of
voluntary intoxication if intoxication negates a requisite mental element of a
crime. Id. at 290. Other jurisdictions allow a voluntarily intoxicated defendant to assert that intoxication negated the mental states of acting purposely
or knowingly but not recklessly or negligently. Id. at 290-91. Another approach that some states take is to permit evidence of voluntary intoxication
only to negate an intention or a purpose but not knowledge. Id. at 291. Other
jurisdictions take the approach of allowing the defense of voluntary intoxication for specific intent crimes but not general intent crimes, in accord with the
common law approach. Id. at 291-92. Some states allow a defendant to raise
the defense of voluntary intoxication for murder if that defendant can demonstrate that the intoxication had the effect of negating his deliberation or premeditation. Id. at 292. Finally, there are some jurisdictions that preclude defendants from asserting the defense of voluntary intoxication for any criminal
act. Id. at 293.
23. See, e.g., United States v. Romano, 482 F.2d 1183, 1196 (5th Cir. 1973)
(explaining that a defendant who is voluntarily under the influence of a drug
may not be capable of formulating a requisite specific intent).
24. See supra note 22 for a discussion of different approaches that jurisdictions take to the voluntary intoxication defense.
25. See infra notes 52-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of some
states that do not allow voluntary intoxication as a defense.
26. Maine provides that a defendant may introduce evidence of intoxication
to create a reasonable doubt as to whether a requisite criminal intent existed
at the time of the commission of the crime. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §
37 (West 1987). See, e.g., Maine v. Foster 405 A.2d 726, 729 (Me. 1979)
(explaining that intoxication is a defense when it raises a reasonable doubt as
to the defendant's ability to knowingly or intentionally desire the act or result). Intoxication is not a defense where the culpable mental state of a crime
is recklessness. Title 17-A, § 37.
Arizona's approach to the voluntary intoxication defense differs from
Maine's approach. Arizona courts provide that a defendant can assert that
voluntary intoxication negated the specific intent required for the commission
of a crime. See, e.g., Arizona v. Jamison, 517 P.2d 1241, 1246 (Ariz. 1974)
(stating that a defendant may use evidence of voluntary intoxication only to
negate a specific intent, and not a general intent). See generally Arizona v.
Morales, 587 P.2d 236, 243-44 (Ariz. 1978) (explaining that voluntary intoxi-
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vides that a criminal actor can assert the defense if, because of his
intoxication, an element of the charged crime did not exist when
the criminal act was committed.27 Kentucky courts allow voluntary intoxication as a defense for intentional crimes, but voluntary
intoxication does not constitute a defense for unintentional
crimes.' A defendant in Kentucky can also assert the voluntary
intoxication defense to reduce a crime from a higher degree to a
lower degree.2 9
Similar to Kentucky, Wisconsin law allows a defendant to assert the voluntary intoxication defense when his intoxication negates the existence of an essential state of mind." A defendant
cation cannot mitigate murder to manslaughter); Arizona v. Steelman, 585
P.2d 1213, 1226 (Ariz. 1978) (stating that a defendant can introduce evidence
of voluntary intoxication to negate a requisite specific intent). In Arizona, a
defendant cannot argue that because of voluntary intoxication he could not

form the malice aforethought necessary for murder. Morales, 587 P.2d at 24344.

Pennsylvania takes an approach similar to Arizona. In Pennsylvania, voluntary intoxication does not excuse criminal conduct but is legally significant
if the defendant's mental capacity is so affected that intoxication renders him

unable to form the specific intent element of the crime. See, e.g., Pennsylva-

nia v. England, 375 A.2d 1292, 1301 (Pa. 1977) (explaining that the effect of
intoxication can negate the requisite specific intent to kill). The effects of alcohol may render the criminal actor not able to form the requisite intent,
thereby reducing the crime to a lesser degree of murder. Id. However, voluntary intoxication cannot reduce a criminal act from murder to manslaughter.
Id.
27. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 501.080 (Michie 1990).
28. See Brown v. Kentucky, 575 S.W.2d 451, 452 (Ky. 1979) (asserting that
while voluntary intoxication is not a defense for unintentional offenses, it is a
defense for crimes where a requisite element is knowledge or intent). In
Brown, the trial court had refused to instruct the jury on the voluntary intoxication defense, and thus the jury found the defendant guilty of first-degree
manslaughter, and the Court of Appeals of Kentucky affirmed. Id. at 451-52.
The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the conviction, asserting that the trial
court was required to submit instructions on the defense of voluntary intoxication to the jury. Id. at 452. The court explained that there was sufficient
evidence concerning the defendant's intoxicated state from which the jury
could conclude that the defendant was unable to form the requisite mens rea.
Id. at 451.
29. See Henson v. Kentucky, 314 S.W.2d 197, 198 (Ky. 1958) (explaining
that evidence of a defendant's intoxication can reduce that defendant's crime
from murder to voluntary manslaughter but intoxication cannot completely
exonerate a defendant from criminal responsibility).
30. See WIS. STAT. § 939.42 (1982); Roe v. Wisconsin, 290 N.W.2d 291, 297
(Wis. 1980) (asserting that a defendant must prove that alcohol rendered him
incapable of formulating the requisite intent to kill); Wisconsin v. Mills, 214
N.W.2d 456, 459 (Wis. 1974) (explaining that a defendant can assert the voluntary intoxication defense if intoxication negated an element of intent required for the crime); Wisconsin v. Hedstrom, 322 N.W.2d 513, 515 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1982) (holding that the defense of voluntary intoxication is a negative
defense because it negates an element that the state must prove to convict a
criminal actor).
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must produce sufficient evidence that intoxication materially affected his ability to formulate the required mens rea.3' In addition,
Wisconsin law provides that intoxication which provokes a heat of
passion can reduce a murder charge to a crime of a lesser degree."
Indiana's approach differs from that of Kentucky and Wisconsin. Indiana law allows criminal actors to assert the voluntary
intoxication defense for offenses that either use the phrase "with
intent to" or "with an intention to.'n A defendant can properly
raise the voluntary intoxication defense only to show that intoxication negated a requisite element of the offense." Once the defendant has raised the defense, however, the prosecution must
prove that the defendant was able to form the requisite mens rea
despite his intoxicated state.3 5
California takes an entirely different approach from that of
Indiana, Kentucky, and Wisconsin. In California, a defendant can
submit evidence of intoxication to the trier of fact to assert that he
had not formulated a requisite specific intent. 6 If the elements of
the crime include a specific intent, a defendant can also argue that
because of intoxication he was incapable of deliberating, premeditating, or harboring malice aforethought. 7 California case law is
consistent with this statutory limitation on the voluntary intoxi31. See Wisconsin v. Strege, 343 N.W.2d 100, 102 (Wis. 1984) (explaining
that a defendant must show that intoxication impaired his condition). A defendant is not guilty of first-degree murder if, at the time of a shooting, intoxication rendered him incapable of formulating an intent to kill. Id. at 103.
32. See Wisconsin v. Heisler, 344 N.W.2d 190, 193 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983)
(explaining that Wisconsin law provides for a heat of passion defense that can
reduce second degree murder to manslaughter). The heat of passion defense
has an objective and a subjective part. Id. In Heisler, the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals explained that a defendant's intoxication is relevant for the subjective
effects of that intoxication on the defendant. Id. at 193. However, the objective part of the heat of passion defense requires proof of the existence of sufficient provocation such that a high degree of rage, anger, or terror would affect a reasonable, sober person in the same manner that the provocation
affected the defendant. Id. The objective portion of the heat of passion defense does not allow evidence that the defendant was intoxicated. Id. Consequently, this objective part limits the availability of the intoxication defense.
Id.
33. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-5 (Michie 1994).
34. Id. See, e.g., Weaver v. Indiana, 643 N.E.2d 342, 344 (Ind. 1994)
(stating that a defendant may assert the voluntary intoxication defense where
intoxication prevented him from forming the requisite intent).
35. Weaver v. Indiana, 627 N.E.2d 1311, 1313 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)
(explaining that the state bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant was not so inebriated that he could not form the
requisite criminal intent), rev'd on other grounds, 643 N.E.2d 342, 345 (Ind.
1994); Jones v. Indiana, 458 N.E.2d 274, 276 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (explaining
that intoxication must deprive the defendant of the ability to form the necessary mens rea).
36. CAL. PENAL CODE § 22 (West 1988).
37. Id.
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cation defense.38 Many jurisdictions take similar approaches to
39
California and allow the defense only for specific intent crimes.
In general terms, the voluntary intoxication defense consists
of two burdens: a burden of introducing evidence and a burden of
persuasion. ' In all jurisdictions, the defendant has the responsibility of producing evidence of intoxication. 1 Once the defendant
has presented evidence of his drunkenness, states differ as to
whether the defendant or the prosecution bears the burden of persuasion.42 In some jurisdictions the defendant has the burden of
persuasion, which means he has the responsibility of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that he either did not or could not
form the necessary criminal intent. 43 In these states, voluntary intoxication operates as a failure of proof defense; that is, the defendant introduces evidence of intoxication to demonstrate that the
prosecution failed to prove that he possessed the requisite mens
rea.4 On the other hand, some jurisdictions provide that voluntary

38. See, e.g., California v. Walker, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431, 434 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993) (explaining that voluntary intoxication can negate a specific intent);
California v. Page, 163 Cal. Rptr. 839, 842 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (finding that
voluntary intoxication can negate the requisite specific intent for the crime of
robbery).
39. See, e.g., Illinois v. Baczkowski, 535 N.E.2d 484, 487-88 (l. App. Ct.
1989) (stating that voluntary intoxication is only a defense for specific intent
crimes); Pennsylvania v. England, 375 A.2d 1292, 1301 (Pa. 1977) (explaining
that voluntary intoxication is legally significant only if it affects the defendant's ability to formulate a requisite specific intent).
40. Anderegg, supra note 14, at 939. See BLACK'S, supra note 15, at 196
(defining the burden of persuasion as a party's task of convincing a trier of
fact of the elements of the case).
41. Anderegg, supra note 14, at 939. A party's obligation to introduce sufficient evidence to avoid a judge ruling against that party on that issue is the
burden of producing evidence. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. A defendant may fail to show by a preponderance of the evidence
that he was not capable of formulating the necessary criminal intent. Id. At
the same time, the prosecution could fail to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the defendant was able to able to form the necessary mens rea. Id. at
940. As a result, prosecutors have a difficult time convicting intoxicated defendants even when the defendant did not prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that he was not capable of forming the requisite mental state. Id.
Despite this problem, jurisdictions do place the burden of proving how intoxication affected the defendant's mental state on the defendant himself. See,
e.g., Hobgood v. Housewright, 698 F.2d 962, 963 (8th Cir. 1983) (explaining
that the defendant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that voluntary intoxication negated a requisite element of the crime);
Massachusetts v. Costello, 467 N.E.2d 811, 819 (Mass. 1984) (stating that the
Commonwealth does not have the burden of disproving that the defendant
was not intoxicated); Minneapolis v. Altimus, 238 N.W.2d 851, 858 (Minn.
1976) (finding that the defendant must prove the defense of voluntary intoxication by a preponderance of the evidence).
44. See, e.g., O'Neill, supra note 9, at 40 (explaining that voluntary intoxication is a "failure of proof' argument because it negates a requisite element
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intoxication is an affirmative defense. Accordingly, the prosecution must persuade the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant's intoxication did not prohibit him from forming the
requisite mens rea. 45
Another point on which jurisdictions differ is whether a state
will utilize the capacity intoxication defense or the ordinary intoxication defense.'
The capacity intoxication defense questions
whether the defendant was capable of forming the requisite mental state.'7 On the other hand, the ordinary intoxication defense
allows a criminal actor to introduce evidence to prove that intoxication negated the mens rea required for the crime.' 8 The United
States Supreme Court has held that any limitations on the defense
of voluntary intoxication should be left to the discretion of the individual states.'4 As a result, the individual states have developed
many different approaches to the voluntary intoxication defense.
The lack of consistency in state courts' treatment of this defense
suggests that it is not a protection constitutionally guaranteed to
criminal defendants. 5
B. The Minority Approach: The Advocates of Personal
Responsibility
The trend in many states is to allow criminal actors to use the
fact that they were intoxicated during the commission of their
crime to negate a required element of the crime."1 There is, howof a crime).
45. Anderegg, supra note 14, at 939 (discussing jurisdictions that place the
burden of persuasion on the prosecution as opposed to the defendant); see also
Iowa v. Templeton, 258 N.W.2d 380, 383 (Iowa 1977) (asserting that when the
defendant properly raises the voluntary intoxication defense, the burden of
persuasion as to the existence of the requisite criminal intent remains with
the prosecution); Washington v. Carter, 643 P.2d 916, 918 (Wash. 1982)
(explaining that the defendant's due process guarantee may require the
prosecution to disprove the defense of voluntary intoxication beyond a reasonable doubt); Wisconsin v. Strege, 343 N.W.2d 100, 105 (Wis. 1984) (stating
that the court may not require the defendant to bear the burden of persuasion
for the voluntary intoxication defense).
46. Anderegg, supra note 14, at 938. This Comment uses the terms
'capacity defense" and "ordinary defense". These are the same terms used in
the Anderegg Note. Id.
47. Id.

48. Id. at 939.
49. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013, 2022 (1996) (explaining that a
state can limit the presentation of relevant evidence in appropriate circumstances). The Supreme Court held that the United States Constitution does
not preclude a state from limiting or even preventing presentation of evidence
of a defendant's intoxication. Id. at 2024.
50. Id. at 2021 (explaining that the voluntary intoxication defense is not a
fundamental element of the criminal justice system).
51. See supra notes 26-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of states
that allow a defendant to introduce evidence of intoxication to negate the intent element of a crime.
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ever, a minority of states that do not allow defendants to assert
voluntary intoxication to abolish a requisite mens rea. 2 For example, in Texas, courts do not allow defendants to assert voluntary
intoxication as a defense to a crime.' Texas courts have held that
the Federal Constitution does not mandate that a court affirmatively instruct a jury to consider factors that can mitigate a crime,
such as evidence of intoxication."
The courts in South Carolina take a similar approach to the
Texas courts and assert that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to a crime. 5 In South Carolina v. Vaughn," the state su-

52. See, e.g., Lerma v. Texas, 632 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982)
(asserting that voluntary intoxication does not render a defendant incapable
of acting intentionally and cannot operate as a defense for an individual's
criminal acts). But see N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.25 (McKinney 1987) (providing
that while intoxication is not a defense, a defendant may aver that intoxication negated a necessary element of the crime); New York v. Lang, 532
N.Y.S.2d 927, 927 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (explaining that the trier of fact is
entitled to consider the effects of intoxication on a defendant when determining whether that defendant was capable of acting with the requisite mental
state); New York v. DiPaola, 532 N.Y.S.2d 606, 608 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988)
(explaining that intoxication can render a defendant incapable of formulating
the requisite intent for specific intent crimes).
53. See, e.g., Juhasz v. Texas, 827 S.W.2d 397, 406 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992)
(asserting that a criminal actor cannot argue that voluntary intoxication is a
defense). In Juhasz, evidence that the defendant had been consuming alcohol
all day and had smoked marijuana confirmed that the defendant had been intoxicated at the time of her crime. Id. However, the Court of Appeals of
Texas held that because the defendant's intoxication was voluntary, her intoxication would not provide her with a defense. Id. Compare Lee v. Texas,
874 S.W.2d 220, 223 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (explaining that a defendant may, in
order to mitigate his punishment, assert that voluntary intoxication rendered
him insane) with Tucker v. Texas, 771 S.W.2d 523, 533 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988)
(explaining that the Texas Penal Code expressly provides that a defendant
cannot claim voluntary intoxication as a defense to a crime).
54. See, e.g., Cordova v. Texas, 733 S.W.2d 175, 189-90 (Tex. Crim. App.
1987) (stating that a court does not have a duty to instruct the jury that it is
required to consider mitigating evidence); Demouchette v. Texas, 731 S.W.2d
75, 80 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (explaining that it is not necessary for a trial
court to affirmatively instruct the jury on how to apply mitigating evidence).
In Texas, a defendant can offer evidence of intoxication only to mitigate the
punishment for his crime. Cordova, 733 S.W.2d at 189. The Cordova court
explained that a trial court must instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication as
a mitigating factor only if the defendant has established that alcohol or drugs
rendered him temporarily insane. Id. at 190. To prove temporary insanity, a
defendant must prove that he did not know that his conduct was wrong or
that intoxication rendered him incapable of acting in accordance with the law.
Id. at 190.
55. See South Carolina v. Scott, 237 S.E.2d 886, 892-93 (S.C. 1977)
(explaining that voluntary intoxication is not an excuse or a defense for criminal conduct unless it resulted in permanent insanity); South Carolina v.
Vaughn, 232 S.E.2d 328, 330 (S.C. 1977) (holding that voluntary intoxication
is not a defense to a crime regardless of whether the crime involved a general
intent or a specific intent).
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preme court of South Carolina held that a man who becomes intoxicated by his own design is accountable for his actions.57 The
Vaughn court asserted that people are aware of the effect that intoxication has on their actions.' In light of this fact, the court explained that people have a duty to refrain from putting themselves
in a condition in which they could potentially endanger others."
The Vaughn court concluded that the principle of personal accountability supports its decision to preclude defendants from asserting voluntary intoxication as a defense.'
II. STATES CAN ABOLISH THE VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION DEFENSE
WITHOUT COMPROMISING A DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS
GUARANTEES
The United States Supreme Court has asserted that a state
must prove all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt before the people have the right to hold a criminal actor accountable
for his actions.61 Judges and legal scholars argue that limiting a
defendant's use of the voluntary intoxication defense violates a defendant's due process guarantee under the Constitution.'2 Other
courts, however, have held that restricting the use of the defense
56. 232 S.E.2d at 328.
57. Id. at 331.
58. Id. (citing 22 C.J.S. CriminalLaw § 66 (1961)).
59. Id.

60. Id.
61. See O'Neill, supra note 9, at 41 (explaining the due process rights the
Constitution guarantees to criminal defendants (citing Mullaney v. Wilbur,
421 U.S. 684, 699 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970))). Both Mullaney and Winship assert that a criminal defendant's due process protection
demands that a state must prove all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable
doubt before a state can hold a defendant criminally responsible for his actions. Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 704; Winship, 397 U.S. at 361. But see Montana
v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013, 2024 (1996) (holding that the Due Process Clause
does not preclude a state's right to refuse to allow a trier of fact to consider
evidence of a defendant's drunkenness). In Egelhoff, the court explained that
the defendant had the burden of establishing that the right to present evidence of intoxication to a jury was a fundamental guarantee of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 2019. However, the court held that the presentation of
such evidence is not constitutionally guaranteed. Id. at 2021 n.6.
62. See O'Neill, supra note 9, at 41 (discussing the constitutional problems
that arise when a jurisdiction restricts a defendant's use of the voluntary intoxication defense (citing Terry v. Indiana, 465 N.E.2d 1085, 1088 (Ind.
1984))). In Terry, the Supreme Court of Indiana asserted that a trier of fact is
compelled to consider any evidence that suggests that the defendant did not
have the requisite mens rea. Terry, 465 N.E.2d at 1088. If a state precludes a
defendant from presenting evidence of intoxication, that state avoids proving
the existence of a mens rea and thereby violates due process. Id. See also
Sills v. Indiana, 463 N.E.2d 228, 243 (Ind. 1984) (Givan, C.J., concurring in
result) (arguing that Indiana's limitations on the voluntary intoxication defense allows persons in similar circumstances to assert different defenses, and
this violates a defendant's constitutional rights).
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of voluntary intoxication does not infringe upon a defendant's constitutional rights.'
A. The Constitution Guarantees CriminalActors CertainDue
Process Rights
To determine whether a defendant has a fundamental right to
assert the voluntary intoxication defense, it is necessary to recognize what constitutional protections are afforded criminal defendants." The United States Constitution guarantees criminal defendants the right of due process of law.6 The fundamental idea
behind due process is to protect the life and liberty of American
citizens." Generally, in order to ensure that a state does not
wrongfully deprive a criminal actor of his freedom, the Constitution provides that prosecutors must prove a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt."' Specifically, the law demands that the
63. See, e.g., Wyant v. Delaware, 519 A.2d 649, 660 (Del. 1986) (explaining
that the Constitution does not guarantee defendants the right to assert the
voluntary intoxication defense). In Wyant, the defendant argued that when
the State prohibited him from asserting voluntary intoxication to negate the
requisite element of intent, the State was in effect violating the defendant's
constitutional due process rights. Id. at 659. However, the Supreme Court of
Delaware rejected this argument and asserted that the State still has the
burden of proving the elements of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
at 660. Once the State proves the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt, the State has the freedom to provide for additional defenses and assign
the responsibility of proving those defenses as they desire. Id. at 658. See
also Hobgood v. Housewright, 698 F.2d 962, 963 (8th Cir. 1983) (explaining
that the Constitution does not require that the prosecution disprove a defendant's intoxication to hold the defendant criminally liable).
64. A criminal defendant's due process rights provide that the state must
prove the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt before the state can
hold the defendant criminally liable. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 704
(1975). If a state that disallows the voluntary intoxication defense violates
the defendant's due process rights, the defendant has a constitutional right to
the voluntary intoxication defense. See, e.g., Wyant, 519 A.2d at 660 (refusing
to accept the defendant's argument that he had a constitutional right to the
voluntary intoxication defense); Wisconsin v. Strege, 343 N.W.2d 100, 105
(Wis. 1984) (stating that the Constitution guarantees that the state must
prove all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt before the state can
hold a defendant criminally liable).
65. U.S. CONST. amend. V. "No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law." Id. The United States Constitution
also provides that states must guarantee criminal defendants due process of
law. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. "No State shall... deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Id.
66. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970). See also Mullaney, 421 U.S. at
700 (stating that the criminal defendant has a critical interest in protecting
his freedom).
67. Winship, 397 U.S. at 362. A fundamental, common law idea is that
criminal cases require a high degree of persuasion. Id. at 361. The
"reasonable doubt" formula developed as the standard in approximately the
year 1798. Id. Common law jurisdictions now accept the formula that the
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people cannot punish a criminal actor for criminal thoughts if he
has failed to commit a criminal act." In addition, criminal jurisprudence provides that a state cannot punish an actor if he did not
have the requisite mental state at the time he committed his
crime. Therefore, if society is to take an accused's life or liberty,
the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant performed the criminal act.70 The prosecution must also
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused possessed the
requisite mental state at the time he committed his crime.7'
The reasonable doubt standard protects criminal actors from
unjust and questionable convictions.72 This standard also reduces
71
the risk of convicting an accused person based on factual error.
Thus, the reasonable doubt standard ensures that individuals will
have confidence in our criminal law system because the state cannot punish
an individual if a reasonable doubt as to his guilt ex74
ists.

B. ConstitutionalPropriety of Abolishing the Voluntary
Intoxication Defense
In states that allow voluntary intoxication as an affirmative
defense, the prosecution bears the burden of disproving the defendant's intoxication.75 Judges and legal scholars argue that disalstate must convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of all
elements of a crime. Id. See also Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 701 (stating that the
prosecution bears the burden of persuading the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the crime that the state has charged
him with).
68. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 3, § 25, at 177.
69. Id. § 27, at 191-92.
70. Mullaney, 421 U.S. 684, 700-01 (1975). See also LAFAVE & SCOTT, su-

pra note 3, § 25, at 177 (stating that a person must commit a criminal act for a
court to find him guilty of a crime).
71. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 3, § 28, at 201 (stating that a court
must find that a criminal actor possessed the requisite mental state in order
to hold him criminally liable).
72. Winship, 397 U.S. at 363 (explaining that if the trier of fact has a reasonable doubt regarding the existence of an element of the crime, the state is
not justified under the law in taking a man's life or liberty) (citing Davis v.
United States, 160 U.S. 469, 484, 493 (1895)).
73. See id. (stating that the reasonable doubt standard supports the fundamental criminal law principle that an accused is innocent until proven
guilty).
74. See id. at 363-64. As society is interested in preserving an individual's
autonomy and reputation, it must not punish a man for a crime if there exists
a reasonable doubt as to his culpability. The design of the reasonable doubt
standard is to ensure that courts will not punish innocent men, thereby protecting the effectiveness of the criminal law. Id.
75. See Weaver v. Indiana, 627 N.E.2d 1311, 1313 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)
(explaining that the state must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that intoxication did not render the defendant incapable of forming the requisite intent), rev'd on other grounds, 643 N.E.2d 342, 345 (Ind. 1994); Washington v.
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lowing voluntary intoxication as an affirmative defense is a constitutional violation."' They assert that when a defendant is precluded from affirmatively asserting the voluntary intoxication defense, the government denies the defendant his right to due
process of law. Specifically, the defendant is denied the opportunity to argue that the government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the necessary mens rea.7
This argument fails, however, because states that disallow
voluntary intoxication as an affirmative defense do not pierce the
shield of constitutional protections guaranteed to criminal defendants because the state must still prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 8 Some states that allow voluntary intoxication as an affirmative defense burden the prosecution with
proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the accused was not so
intoxicated that he was unable to form the requisite mental state.7 9
Jurisdictions that place this burden on prosecutors make it more
difficult to convict intoxicated offenders because the prosecution
must jump an extra hurdle in order to hold the defendant criminally liable. 0 Jurisdictions that do not allow voluntary intoxicaCarter, 643 P.2d 916, 919 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (stating that the prosecution
must prove the defendant was not too intoxicated to form the necessary
criminal intent).
76. O'Neill, supra note 9, at 40.
77. Id. at 41.
78. See, e.g., Hobgood v. Housewright, 698 F.2d 962, 963 (8th Cir. 1983)
(holding that the state does not deny a defendant his right to due process of
law if that state places the burden on the defendant to prove that intoxication
rendered him unable to form the requisite criminal intent); Wyant v. Delaware, 519 A.2d 649, 660 (Del. 1986) (stating that the Delaware Legislature did
not violate a defendant's constitutional rights when it abolished the voluntary
intoxication defense).
79. See Illinois v. Baczkowski, 535 N.E.2d 484, 488 (IMI.App. Ct. 1989)
(stating that once an intoxicated defendant produces evidence tending to show
that he did not possess the mens rea, the prosecution is then burdened with
overcoming the defendant's affirmative defense). The prosecution must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the requisite mens rea existed. See, e.g.,
Brown v. Kentucky, 555 S.W.2d 252, 256-57 (Ky. 1977) (explaining that the
Commonwealth has the burden of negating the intoxication defense once the
defendant has properly raised it); ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS:

CRIMINAL § 24-25.02A at 310 (West 1992) (stating the Illinois pattern jury instructions for the voluntary intoxication defense). For the state to hold an intoxicated defendant criminally accountable, the prosecution must show "[tjhat
at the time of the offense, the defendant's voluntarily intoxicated or drugged
condition was not so extreme as to suspend the power of reason and render
him incapable of forming a specific intent which is an element of the offense of
[the crime charged]." Id. The Illinois pattern jury instruction for the voluntary intoxication defense has the effect of placing an additional burden on the
prosecution beyond that of proving the existence of the elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. See id.
80. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 699 (1975) (explaining that the state
must always prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt). However, jurisdictions that burden the prosecution with disproving a defendant's
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tion as an affirmative defense do not force prosecutors to leap this

additional hurdle.8 In these states, it is the defendant who has
the responsibility of establishing that alcohol rendered him incapable of forming the requisite criminal mens rea. 2 In order to
convict the defendant, however, the prosecutor must still prove the
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 8' Therefore, the
defendant's right to due process of law is still protected.
Furthermore, the Constitution does not guarantee that a defendant may assert the defense of voluntary intoxication.'
In
Montana v. Egelhoff,8 the United States Supreme Court held that
a defendant has neither a fundamental nor a constitutional right
to present evidence of voluntary intoxication to a jury in an attempt to disestablish the existence of a mens rea.8 In fact, the

Court went so far as to say that it is not unconstitutional for a
state to alter its criminal justice system in order to enable prosecutors
,to more
easily
convict have
defendants
of the charged
Therefore,
state
legislatures
the authority
to abolishcrimes."
volun-

intoxication force the prosecution to prove more than the existence of the essential elements of the crime, and as a result it is more difficult to convict
criminal actors. See, e.g., Washington v. Carter, 643 P.2d 916, 918 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1982) (explaining that the prosecution may bear the burden of proving
that the defendant was not intoxicated).
81. In jurisdictions that preclude defendants from asserting voluntary intoxication as an affirmative defense, the prosecution must prove the existence
of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Wyant v. Delaware, 519 A.2d 649, 660 (Del. 1986) (explaining that the state must prove that
the intoxicated defendant possessed the requisite mens rea).
82. See, e.g., Hobgood, 698 F.2d at 963 (stating that the defendant must
prove that intoxication negated his ability to form the requisite element of the
crime).
83. See supra notes 64-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
reasonable doubt standard in the criminal law.
84. Davis v. Delaware, 522 A.2d 342, 345 (Del. 1987). See also Wyant, 519
A.2d at 660 (asserting that the Constitution does not require the defense of
voluntary intoxication).
85. 116 S. Ct. 2013, 2013 (1996).
86. Id. at 2023. In Egelhoff, the court noted that the lack of national acceptance of the voluntary intoxication defense supported the fact that the Constitution does not guarantee the defense. Id. at 2020. The court explained that
the constitution does guarantee defendants some rights; for example, the
right to present evidence of self-defense to a jury may be fundamental. Id. at
2023. However, the right to argue the voluntary intoxication defense is not
similarly integral to a defendant's constitutional rights. Id.
87. Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013, 2023 (1996) (explaining that a
statute making it less difficult for the state to prove a criminal's mental state
beyond a reasonable doubt is not unconstitutional). Egelhoff involved a Montana statute precluding a jury from considering the defendant's intoxication
when deliberating the existence of the defendant's mens rea. Id. at 2016. The
Court recognized that this instruction did reduce the prosecution's burden.
Id. at 2023. However, the statute did not ease the state's burden of proving
the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt but rather made it easier for
the state to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
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tary intoxication as a defense.88
Eliminating voluntary intoxication as an affirmative defense,
however, does not change the prosecution's burden of proving the
existence of the defendant's mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt.88
Therefore, jurisdictions that preclude a defendant from asserting
voluntary intoxication as an affirmative defense do not violate that
defendant's constitutional right to due process of the law.9 Moreover, numerous policy and legal justifications champion the removal
of the voluntary intoxication defense from the criminal codes of the
states that currently allow it.
III. A CRY FOR PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY: WHY JURISDICTIONS
MUST ABOLISH VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION AS AN AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSE
Jurisdictions that allow the voluntary intoxication defense
face many problems in applying the defense. 91 These jurisdictions
must abolish the voluntary intoxication defense in an effort to hold
criminal actors personally responsible for their actions.92 Many
jurisdictions that refuse to allow alcohol induced amnesia 93 as a defense have taken the first step toward eliminating voluntary in88. See, e.g., Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2024 (providing that Montana's jury instructions that precluded a jury from considering evidence of voluntary intoxication when contemplating the defendant's mental state does not violate the
Due Process Clause); Wyant, 519 A.2d at 660 (asserting that as the legislature
has the authority to abolish the voluntary intoxication defense for crimes that
involve reckless conduct, the legislature also has the authority to disallow the
voluntary intoxication defense for crimes involving intentional conduct).
89. Wyant, 519 A.2d at 660 (explaining that the state must always prove
that the defendant possessed the requisite mental state); Sills v. Indiana,463
N.E.2d 228, 236 (Ind. 1984) (stating that when a court refuses to instruct a
jury on the voluntary intoxication defense, that court is not relieving the
prosecutor from proving the elements of criminal intent). If a court determines that the jury may believe that intoxication rendered the defendant unable to form the requisite mental state, the court may instruct the jury to determine if there is a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt. See, e.g.,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 302(b) (1995) (providing that a defendant is entitled
to produce any evidence that tends to "negate the existence of any element of
the offense").
90. See Wyant, 519 A.2d at 660 (holding that a statute that precluded the
defendant from asserting the voluntary intoxication defense did not violate
the defendant's due process rights because the state still had the burden of
proving the defendant's criminal intent).
91. See infra notes 97-140 and accompanying text for a discussion of some
of the problems that accompany the voluntary intoxication defense.
92. See South Carolina v. Vaughn, 232 S.E.2d 328, 331 (S.C. 1977)
(explaining that courts that allow voluntarily intoxicated defendants to escape
criminal liability subvert the criminal law principle of personal accountability).
93 See Illinois v. Lucase, 548 N.E.2d 1003, 1017 (Ill. 1989) (explaining that
alcohol induced amnesia is a blackout that can occur if an individual rapidly
consumes alcohol).
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toxication as an affirmative defense.' States must take the next
step and preclude defendants from asserting the voluntary intoxication defense altogether. Courts currently recognize that even
intoxicated individuals are able to possess a criminal intent while
engaging in a criminal act.95 Some courts have even held defendants criminally liable even though the defendant, because of intoxication, did not possess the requisite mens rea during the
commission of the crime.9
A. Doomed From its Creation:Problems Inherent with the
Voluntary Intoxication Defense
Jurisdictions recognizing the voluntary intoxication defense
would be wise to abolish it because of the problems that accompany the defense.9" For example, courts continuously struggle in
the effort to consistently and evenly apply the defense.98 Furthermore, courts and legal scholars have, for decades, criticized jurisdictions that distinguish between specific and general intent in
their approach to the voluntary intoxication defense." Despite the
criticisms, the impracticality, and the struggle, many jurisdictions
still allow defendants to assert voluntary intoxication as a defense
for their crimes.'o
1.

InconsistenciesAbound: States Continuously Fail to Evenly
Apply the Voluntary Intoxication Defense

Jurisdictions that allow the voluntary intoxication defense
create many problems for themselves because of the way that they
94. See infra notes 154-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of how
jurisdictions confront alcoholic amnesia in the criminal law.
95. See Kansas v. Carr, 634 P.2d 1104, 1108 (Kan. 1981) (explaining that
the intoxicated defendant was capable of forming the requisite specific intent
of the crimes with which the state had charged him); New York v. Lang, 532
N.Y.S.2d 927, 927 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (stating that an intoxicated person is
capable of formulating a criminal intent); New York v. Scott, 488 N.Y.S.2d
719, 719 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (explaining that an intoxicated person can formulate a criminal intent).
96. See infra notes 185-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of courts
that have held a criminal actor liable for his actions where he did not possess
the necessary mental state during the commission of his crime.
97. See infra notes 98-140 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
problems that some jurisdictions face in allowing the voluntary intoxication
defense.
98. See infra notes 101-13, 185-95 and accompanying text for a discussion
of jurisdictions that are inconsistent in their application of the voluntary intoxication defense.
99. 1 ROBINSON, supra note 22, at 298 (explaining that the distinction between specific intent and general intent is troublesome). It may be pointless
for courts to define some intents as specific because a specific intent is no
more specific than other requisite criminal intents. Id.
100. See supra notes 26-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of some
jurisdictions that allow voluntary intoxication as a defense.
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inconsistently allow the use of the defense.1"' An examination of
Wisconsin law illustrates one such inconsistency. The Wisconsin
criminal code provides that voluntary intoxication is a defense
when intoxication negates "the existence of a state of mind essential to the crime.""3 The Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that
defendants can assert the voluntary intoxication defense only for
specific intent crimes.' °3 In Wisconsin v. Heisler,'0 the court of appeals determined that when intoxication excites a defendant into a
heat of passion, the voluntary intoxication defense can reduce second-degree murder to manslaughter.' The Heisler court also explained that second-degree murder is not a specific intent crime
because it does not require a particular state of mind. °6 The Heisler decision has provided defendants with an additional opportunity to assert the voluntary intoxication defense for non-specific
intent crimes.0 7 However, this decision effectively opposes the
Wisconsin Supreme Court's ruling that voluntary intoxication is
only a defense for specific intent crimes."3
101. See supra notes 97-100 and see infra notes 102-13 for a discussion of
the problems that a jurisdiction can face if it fails to develop a consistent approach to the voluntary intoxication defense.
102. WIS. STAT. § 939.42 (1996).
103. Wisconsin v. Strege, 343 N.W.2d 100, 103 (Wis. 1984) (finding that a
defendant may assert that his intoxication rendered him unable to formulate
the requisite intent when an essential element of the crime includes a specific
intent); see also Wisconsin v. Kolisnitschenko, 267 N.W.2d 321, 324 n.6 (Wis.
1978) (stating that voluntary intoxication is only a defense for specific intent
crimes).
104. 344 N.W.2d 190, 190 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983).
105. Id. at 193. See also Ameen v. Wisconsin, 186 N.W.2d 206, 212 (Wis.
1971) (reasoning that where a defendant commits a homicide that would normally constitute first-degree murder, if intoxication rendered the defendant
unable to form an intent to kill, that defendant's crime is reduced to seconddegree murder); Wisconsin v. Brown, 348 N.W.2d 593, 596 (Wis. Ct. App.
1984) (explaining that intoxication can mitigate first-degree murder to seconddegree murder if that intoxication negates the requisite intent).
106. Heisler, 344 N.W.2d at 193 n.3 In Wisconsin, second-degree murder
does not require an intent to perform the act that resulted in the victims
death, nor does it require a particular state of mind. See, e.g., Wisconsin v.
Bernal, 330 N.W.2d 219, 221 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983) (explaining that the elements of second degree murder include that the defendant's actions were
"imminently dangerous to another" person, that the defendant's conduct was
of a nature evincing a depraved mind, disregarding human life, and that the
defendant caused the decedent's death).
107. Heisler, 344 N.W.2d at 193.
108. Id. See Wisconsin v. Strege, 343 N.W.2d 100, 103 (Wis. 1984) (stating
that a defendant can introduce evidence of voluntary intoxication only to
demonstrate that he did not possess the requisite specific intent); Wisconsin
v. Kolisnitschenko, 267 N.W.2d 321, 324 n.6 (Wis. 1978) (explaining that the
voluntary intoxication defense is only available to defendants for specific intent crimes). Compare IND. CODE § 35-41-3-5 (1986) (providing that a defen-

dant can assert the intoxication defense only for offenses that use either the
phrase "with intent to" or "with an intention to") with Jones v. Indiana, 458
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Similar to the courts in Wisconsin, the California courts also
have problems with the voluntary intoxication defense. The California Penal Code provides that a defendant can introduce evidence of voluntary intoxication only when the State has charged a
defendant with a specific intent crime."° However, California case
law has expanded the availability of the voluntary intoxication defense beyond that which the legislature contemplated.
For example, in California v. Saille,"° the state supreme court
stated that an intoxicated offender could introduce evidence to
prove that he was not able to understand his duty to control himself and to act in accordance with the law."' The Saille decision is
inconsistent with established California law allowing defendants
to introduce intoxication "solely on the issue of whether or not the
defendant actually formed a required specific intent, premeditated,
deliberated, or harbored express malice aforethought."" As a result, the Saille decision has created confusion as to when
a defen11
dant can and cannot introduce evidence of intoxication. 3
2. Semantics and Mental Gymnastics: The Problems with Specific
and General Intent
Common law courts created the distinction between specific
intent and general intent crimes in an effort to deal with the
problems associated with intoxicated criminal actors."' Today,
N.E.2d 274, 276 (Ind.Ct. App. 1984) (holding that voluntary intoxication is a
defense if the defendant is so inebriated that he is not able to form the requisite specific intent). In Jones, the Court of Appeals of Indiana expanded the
use of the voluntary intoxication defense beyond that which the statute has
provided because the court's ruling provided that defendants can assert the
voluntary intoxication defense for specific intent crimes that do not use the
statutory required phrases "with intent to" or "with an intention to." Jones,
458 N.E.2d at 276. For example, in Indiana, murder is a specific intent crime.
Sills v. Indiana, 463 N.E.2d 228, 236 (Ind. 1984). However, statutory law
states that a person commits a murder when he "knowingly or intentionally
kills another human being." IND. CODE § 35-42-1-1 (1986). The ruling in
Jones would allow a defendant to assert the voluntary intoxication defense for
the crime of murder. See Jones, 458 N.E.2d at 276. However, the statutory
definition of the voluntary intoxication defense precludes a defendant from
asserting the voluntary intoxication defense against a murder charge. See §
35-41-3-5.
109. CAL. PENAL CODE § 22 (West 1997).
110. 820 P.2d 588 (Cal. 1991).
111. Id. at 592.
112. CAL. PENAL CODE § 22 (West 1997).
113. In the future, arguably California courts should follow the legislative
mandate and only allow evidence of intoxication if it negated the defendant's
ability to form a specific intent, premeditate, deliberate, or harbor malice
aforethought. CAL. PENAL CODE § 22 (West 1997). Alternatively, California
courts could follow the Saille court's ambiguous instruction, and allow a defendant to assert the voluntary intoxication defense when intoxication rendered him unable to act in accordance with the law. 820 P.2d at 592.
114. See, e.g., Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013, 2018-19 (1996)
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some jurisdictions that allow the voluntary intoxication defense
use that same distinction to decide when a defendant can or cannot assert the voluntary intoxication defense. 115 However, since its
creation, courts and legal scholars alike have recognized the incongruities associated with the specific intent-general intent dichotomy."'
General intent crimes include those crimes where the definition describes a particular act without referring to an intent to
achieve a further consequence." 7 For example, courts often determine that murder, manslaughter, and assault are general intent crimes."' On the other hand, a crime that involves a specific
intent requires more than a mere intention to perform an act.'1 '
The actor must have an additional state of mind intending that
further consequences result from his act.' For example, common
law burglary is a specific intent crime.' At common law, burglary
required that the accused intended to break and enter into a
"dwelling of another," and that the defendant specifically intended
"to commit a felony therein."' 22 This distinction between specific
(indicating that in the nineteenth century, courts created a doctrine through
which a criminal actor could assert voluntary intoxication as a defense for
specific intent crimes); California v. Hood, 462 P.2d 370, 377 (Cal. 1969)
(explaining that courts distinguished between specific intent and general intent to respond to the problems associated with intoxicated criminal actors).
115. See, e.g., California v. Gutierrez, 225 Cal. Rptr. 885, 887 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986) (explaining that the foundation of the voluntary intoxication defense
rests on the distinction between specific intent and general intent crimes); Illinois v. Baczkowski, 535 N.E.2d 484, 487 (IlM. App. Ct. 1989) (explaining that

voluntary intoxication is a defense for specific intent crimes); Susan D.Burke,

Note, The Defense of Voluntary Intoxication:Now You See It, Now You Don't,
19 IND. L. REV. 147, 147-48 (1986) (explaining that the distinction between
general intent and specific intent is important with respect to the voluntary
intoxication defense).
116. See Hood, 462 P.2d at 378 (finding that the difference between general
intent and specific intent is "chimerical" with respect to some crimes); Illinois
v. Rosas, 429 N.E.2d 898, 900 (IlM. App. Ct. 1981) (explaining that the distinction between specific intent and general intent is illogical with respect to the
voluntary intoxication defense); Sills v. Indiana, 463 N.E.2d 228, 242 (Ind.
1984) (Givan, C.J., concurring in result) (questioning the courts use of the
words "specific intent" and "general intent"); Carter v. Indiana, 408 N.E.2d
790, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (discussing the courts' inability to clearly define
what specific intent means); Matthew J. Boettcher, Note, Voluntary Intoxication: A Defense to Specific Intent Crimes, 65 U. DET. L. REV. 33, 38-39 (1987)
(discussing the differences between specific intent and general intent).
117. Hood, 462 P.2d at 378. See also Anderegg, supra note 14, at 937 n.24
(explaining that a "general intent only refers to the intentional performance of

the proscribed act").

118. Jerome Hall, Intoxication and Criminal Responsibility, 57 HARV. L.

REV. 1045, 1062 (1944).

119. New York v. Tocco, 525 N.Y.S.2d 137, 140 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988).

120. Id.
121. LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 3, § 28, at 196.
122. BLACK'S, supra note 15, at 1399 (defining specific intent).
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intent and general intent is only a linguistic difference between an
intention to do an act that has already been performed, and an intention to accomplish that same act in the future."
It is impractical for courts to use the specific intent-general
intent approach because it does not realistically contemplate how
defendants form the requisite mental state for a particular offense. 12 In addition, courts have extreme difficulty classifying
12
some crimes as either a specific intent or a general intent crime.
For example, in California v. Hood, 8 the state supreme court explained that a court could appropriately define assault as either a
specific intent or a general intent crime. 127 The Hood court explained that an assault is an illegal attempt and a present ability
to violently injure another person. 2 ' A court can classify an attempt as a specific intent crime because the actor intends to
achieve a particular result and injure someone.'29 However, an attempt is also a general intent crime because the actor merely intends to commit a violent act.'3 '
In another case, the court pointed out that the distinction between general intent and specific intent is illogical. In Illinois v.
Rosas,"' the state appellate court explained that if intoxication can
negate a specific intent, there is no reason why intoxication cannot
negate a general intent.1 2 Therefore the distinction between the
two intent classifications, with respect to the voluntary intoxication defense, is irrational.'
Another problem with specific intent and general intent arises
when courts fail to explain why they have defined a criminal act as
a specific intent or a general intent crime. For example, in New
York v. Tocco,' 3' the Bronx County Supreme Court explained that
voluntary intoxication is not a defense to a criminal charge.'
In
Tocco, an intoxicated defendant set an apartment building on
fire. 3 6 The court held that the defendant was not guilty of second
123. California v. Hood, 462 P.2d 370, 378 (Cal. 1969).

124. Anderegg, supra note 14, at 937-38.
125. See, e.g., Illinois v. Rosas, 429 N.E.2d 898, 900 (IM. App. Ct. 1982)

(explaining that the difference between a specific intent and a general intent
is not clear); Carter v. Indiana, 408 N.E.2d 790, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)
(discussing the courts' inability to clearly determine what specific intent
means).
126. 462 P.2d at 370.

127. Id. at 378.
128. Id. at 378 n.6.
129. Id.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
429 N.E.2d at 898.
Id. at 900.
Id.
525 N.Y.S.2d at 137.
Id. at 139.
Id.
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degree arson because he did not specifically intend to damage the
building.13 Courts recognize that defendants generally intend for
the natural and probable consequences of their actions.3 8 However, the Tocco court never explained how a defendant could intentionally start two fires in a building but not intend to damage
the building where the natural and probable result of starting a
fire is causing damage.3 9
To suggest that courts must not use the specific intentgeneral intent distinction simply because it is difficult to classify a
crime one way or the other would be unreasonable. However, the
other problems that accompany the specific intent-general intent
classifications, coupled with the principle of personal responsibility, support the contention that courts must find a more workable
approach to the problems associated with the intoxicated offender.
The best solution to the dilemma is to abolish the voluntary intoxication defense altogether."' °
B. Half-Way There: Alcoholic Amnesia is Not a Defense
Sometimes a defendant can experience alcohol induced amnesia if he has consumed so much alcohol that he is unable to recall his criminal act.'4 Alcoholic amnesia, however, is not a defense to a crime in an overwhelming majority of jurisdictions."
137. Id. at 143. New York Penal law defines second degree arson as
"intentionally damag[ing] a building... by starting a fire...." N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 150.15 (McKinney 1997).
138. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 3, § 28, at 202. See also Jones v. Indiana,
458 N.E.2d 274, 276 (Ind.Ct. App. 1984) (explaining that where a defendant is
capable of designing a plan, he is also capable of intending the natural and
probable consequences of his actions); New York v. DiPaola, 532 N.Y.S.2d 606,
607-08 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (explaining that a court will assume that a defendant is cognizant of what will result from his acts).
139. Tocco, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 143 (finding the defendant guilty of fourth degree arson because he "recklessly damag[ed] a building ...by intentionally
starting a fire." (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAw § 150.05[1] (McKinney 1987)). See
also New York v. Keith, 365 N.Y.S.2d 570, 571 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975)
(affirming the lower court's conviction of fourth degree arson where the defendant knowingly threw a cigarette into a hayloft, but did not care whether
he started a fire). The court in Keith explained that it was appropriate, in
light of the defendant's actions, for the jury to infer that the defendant possessed the requisite mens rea. Id.
140. See infra notes 196-201 and accompanying text for a proposed solution
to the problems of the voluntary intoxication defense.
141. Illinois v. Lucas, 548 N.E.2d 1003, 1017 (Ill.
1989). In Lucas, a certified
addictions counselor explained that alcohol induced amnesia can occur when a
person consumes alcohol too quickly. Id. What results is a "short-term memory loss," and the person who has experienced the blackout will not be able to
remember events from a specific time period. Id.
142. See, e.g., Jones v. Indiana, 458 N.E.2d 274, 277 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984)
(affirming the defendant's burglary conviction). In Jones, the defendant explained that, due to intoxication, he could not remember occurrences from the
night of his alleged criminal activity. Id. However, the Appellate Court of
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The rationale as gleaned from the civil law's and the criminal law's
approach to alcohol induced amnesia supports why jurisdictions
must abolish voluntary intoxication as an affirmative defense.
1.

Alcoholic Amnesia in the Civil Law

At least one civil court has dealt with the problems associated
with alcohol induced amnesia. 4 1 In Parvi v. Kingston,'" the plaintiff filed a false imprisonment action against the City of Kingston
after the police coerced the intoxicated plaintiff into a police car

and drove him outside of the city limits. 14 5 At trial, the plaintiff

explained that he could not remember his confinement in the police car.'" This presented a problem for the plaintiffs false imprisonment claim because a necessary element of the plaintiffs claim
was that he was cognizant of his confinement." 7
While intoxication may induce a person into an amnesiac
state such that he is unable to remember an event subsequent to
its occurrence, it is possible that the person was in fact conscious of
his actions during the actual event. '" For instance, in Parvi the
New York Court of Appeals explained that just because the plaintiff was not sober during the time of his confinement does not9
mean that he was not cognizant of what was happening to him."1
The court asserted that the facts of the record reflected that the
plaintiff was conscious of his confinement; therefore, the court distinguished between the plaintiffs cognizance at the time of his
confinement and his subsequent inability to recollect that consciousness."
Similarly, one could argue that even an intoxicated criminal
actor was aware of his actions during the commission of a crime,
despite his inability to later recall those actions. A criminal defendant may assert that because of his intoxication he does not re-

Indiana explained that even though the defendant was subject to blackouts
while intoxicated, the defendant was still capable of forming the requisite
criminal intent. Id.
143. Parvi v. Kingston, 362 N.E.2d 960, 960-63 (N.Y. 1977).
144. Id. at 960.
145. Id. at 962.
146. Id. at 963.
147. Id. at 962-63. The elements of false imprisonment require a plaintiff to

prove that the defendant intentionally confined the plaintiff, that the plaintiff
was cognizant of his confinement, that the plaintiff had not given the defen-

dant consent to the confinement, and that there was no privilege for the confinement. Id.
148. See, e.g., Oregon v. Corgain, 663 P.2d 773, 776 (Or. Ct. App. 1983)
(noting that a doctor who testified at trial on behalf of the state asserted that
despite the defendant's alcohol induced amnesia, he was still capable of having committed his criminal acts with a conscious objective).
149. Parvi, 362 N.E.2d at 963.
150. Id.
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member committing a criminal act.15 ' However, this does not mean
that the defendant was not conscious of his actions at the time of
his crime. 1 2 Criminal courts must follow the Parvi court's reasoning and examine the defendant's actions surrounding the crime;
that is, the court must examine the actions that indicate the defendant's awareness and comprehension of his criminal act.'5 A
problem arises, however, because awareness of activity is not the
same as criminal intent. Thus, the question becomes whether a
person could have possessed a criminal intent for an act that they
are subsequently unable to remember.
2. Alcoholic Amnesia in the CriminalLaw
Episodic amnesia occurs when a defendant, because of the illeffects of alcohol, cannot remember a criminal act subsequent to
its commission."M However, episodic amnesia is not a defense for
criminal acts that the defendant commits during such an episode
of amnesia."" In fact, courts recognize that intoxicated defendants
are capable of forming the intent necessary to commit specific intent crimes.' 56 Courts have held defendants criminally liable even
if they were so intoxicated that they were not able to remember
their criminal act.'
Courts do not allow alcohol induced amnesia
as a defense because an intoxicated defendant is still capable of
committing criminal acts with a criminal intent, even if alcohol
subsequently renders him unable to remember his criminal activ-

151. See, e.g., United States v. Riege, 5 M.J. 938, 942 (N-M.C.M.R. 1978)
(finding that a defendant who had no memory of his crime could not assert
alcohol induced amnesia as a defense for his crime).
152. Corgain, 663 P.2d at 776 (stating that the defendant could have com-

mitted his criminal act with a conscious objective, even though intoxication
affected the defendant's ability to later remember those acts).
153. Parvi, 362 N.E.2d at 963 (reasoning that the facts of the record indicated that the plaintiff was aware of his false imprisonment despite his later
inability to remember the occurrence).
154. Jackson v. Georgia, 253 S.E.2d 874, 876 (Ga. App. 1979).
155. See id. (explaining that the inability of an alcoholic amnesiac to remember his criminal act is not a criminal defense).
156. See, e.g., California v. Henderson, 292 P.2d 267, 269 (Cal. Ct. App.
1956) (explaining that the inebriated defendant possessed the specific intent
required for the trier of fact to convict him of burglary); Weaver v. Indiana,
643 N.E.2d 342, 344 (Ind. 1994) (holding that the intoxicated defendant possessed the requisite specific intent to justify the jury's conviction of that defendant for attempted murder). See also Illinois v. Rosas, 429 N.E.2d 898, 900
(Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (noting "that the intent to become intoxicated can take
[the] place of criminal intent, and that criminal intent can simply be presumed from the doing of criminal acts").
157. See, e.g., Illinois v. Hibbler, 274 N.E.2d 101, 103-105 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971)
(affirming the defendant's conviction of forgery despite the defendant's contention that he suffered from alcohol induced amnesia during his criminal act
and was therefore not responsible).
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158

The prosecution must always prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant possessed the requisite mental state because without a mens rea a court cannot hold a defendant criminally liable.1 If alcohol erases a defendant's memory of an event,
it does not necessarily follow that the defendant was unable to
form the requisite specific intent. '6 Courts that hold alcohol amnesiacs criminally responsible still recognize the existence of a
criminal intent despite the defendant's inability to remember his
actions.'
Therefore, a defendant can possess a criminal intent
during the commission of his crime, even though he does not later
remember his criminal act. In order to determine whether a defendant possessed the requisite specific intent, courts must examine a defendant's words and actions surrounding his crime. 6 '
C. Determining Whether a Defendant Possessed the Requisite
Mental State Duringthe Commission of His Crime
Oftentimes a criminal actor, drunk or sober, refuses to explain
what he was thinking or intending during his criminal act. As a
result, courts examine how the defendant acted before, during, and
after the commission of his crime to determine whether or not the
defendant possessed the requisite mens rea.1n In order to convict
an intoxicated criminal actor of a crime, the court must account for
the actions of the defendant surrounding the commission of his
crime; most importantly, the court must account for the defen158. Oregon v. Corgain, 663 P.2d 773, 776 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that
alcohol induced amnesia does not absolve a defendant of criminal liability).
See also Williams v. Georgia, 228 S.E.2d 806, 807 (Ga. Ct. 1976) (holding that
the defendant's inability to remember his criminal act would not absolve him
of the responsibility for raping a woman); McKenty v. Georgia, 217 S.E.2d
388, 389 (Ga. App. 1975) (affirming a defendant's conviction for armed robbery
even though the defendant had no recollection of his criminal act).
159. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
existence of a mens rea as a prerequisite to criminal liability.
160. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Mississippi, 356 So. 2d 1151, 1153 (Miss. 1978)
(explaining that the defendant's actions during and after his crime indicated
that he was conscious of his illegal activity despite his subsequent inability to
remember that activity as a result of alcohol induced amnesia). At trial, the
defendant asserted that intoxication rendered him incapable of forming the
necessary mens rea. Id. at 1153. However, the Mississippi Supreme Court
affirmed the defendant's conviction, thus recognizing that the defendant did
possess the requisite mental state. Id. at 1156.
161. Id.
162. LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 28, at 202. Criminal defendants rarely admit
that they possessed the requisite criminal intent during the commission of
their crime. Id. As a result, a jury must infer from the defendant's words and
actions surrounding the crime what the defendant's thoughts were.
163. See LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 3, § 28, at 203 (explaining that a jury
can decide whether a defendant possessed a requisite criminal intent based
upon his words and actions surrounding the commission of his crime).
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dant's actions that corroborate the existence of the requisite criminal mental state despite his drunkenness.'" Similarly, a court
must explain a defendant's actions and mental state at the time of
a criminal act to justify relieving him of criminal responsibility. A
court's failure to adequately explain its decision will raise a question of its validity. For example, in Tocco, the court justified its
decision by simply stating that second-degree arson is a specific
intent crime and that the defendant was too intoxicated to form
the requisite specific intent." The Tocco court's failure to fully examine the defendant's actions in that context forces the reader to
question the legitimacy of the decision.
A trier of fact must conclude by examining a defendant's actions surrounding his criminal conduct whether that defendant
possessed the requisite mental state." Cases involving intoxicated offenders are no different." 7 In an overwhelming majority of
cases, juries refuse to allow defendants to escape criminal responsibility, even if the defendants were severely intoxicated.'
One Indiana case provides an excellent example of a jury that
rejected a defendant's assertion of the voluntary intoxication defense.6' In Weaver v. Indiana,7 ' the state court of appeals reversed the jury's conviction of an intoxicated defendant for attempted murder holding that there was no evidence that the
defendant had possessed the requisite intent to kill. 7' However,
the Indiana Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision,
reaffirming the jury conviction of attempted murder.7 '
The defendant in Weaver had taken two hits of LSD173 and
was extremely intoxicated. 74 The defendant's friends took him to a
164. See New York v. Seymour, 474 N.Y.S.2d 638, 640 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984)
(explaining that a jury can find that an intoxicated defendant was able to form
the requisite mental state if that defendant's actions at the scene justify their
decision).
165. New York v. Tocco, 525 N.Y.S.2d 137, 143 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
166. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 3, § 28, at 202.
167. Weaver v. Indiana, 627 N.E.2d 1311, 1313 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)
(recognizing that on appeal, the court must look at how the intoxicated defendant behaved before, during, and after his crime to determine if a jury was
reasonable in finding that the defendant had possessed the requisite mental
state), rev'd on other grounds, 643 N.E.2d 342, 345 (Ind. 1994).
168. Weaver v. Indiana, 643 N.E.2d 342, 345 (Ind. 1994) (affirming the trial
court's conviction of an intoxicated defendant for attempted murder); New
York v. Lang, 532 N.Y.S.2d 927, 927 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (stating that the
jury was correct in finding that intoxication did not negate the defendant's
ability to formulate a mens rea).
169. Weaver, 643 N.E.2d at 342.
170. Weaver, 627 N.E.2d at 1311.
171. Id. at 1314.
172. Weaver, 643 N.E.2d at 343.
173. Id. (explaining that lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) is a chemical that
alters sensory input).
174. Weaver, 627 N.E.2d at 1313. Subsequently, the defendant was unable
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forest retreat because they recognized that he "was not in the right
state of mind and [they] really didn't want him to get in trouble."75
At the retreat, the defendant was acting strangely: he kissed and
licked his friend Kurt's neck-, and when another friend attempted
to help Kurt, the defendant bit her fingers. 7 6 In an effort to subdue him, the defendant's friends hit him on the head twice with a
tire jack, but this did not affect the defendant at all.1 7 7 Subsequently, the defendant attacked yet another friend by slamming
her head against the pavement numerous times and kicking her; it
was for this attack that the trial court convicted the defendant for
attempted murder.'
Despite the evidence that the defendant was so intoxicated
that he did not know what he was doing, the jury still rejected the
voluntary intoxication defense. 179 The Indiana Supreme Court took
notice of the fact that the defendant did not have difficulty walking, was able to respond to threats and physical attacks, was capable of throwing his victim down, and was able to kick her and
slam her head to the ground. 8 ° The jury, as well as the Indiana
Supreme Court, recognized that even when an intoxicant severely
affects a defendant he is still capable of formulating the requisite
specific intent for attempted murder.'
This case is an excellent example of how juries reject the voluntary intoxication defense even when the defendant is extremely
intoxicated.'
Both the Indiana Appellate and Supreme Court decisions spend considerable time explaining the defendant's actions
surrounding his crime to justify the decisions. 88 Unlike the Indiana courts, courts that relieve an intoxicated defendant of criminal
responsibility but fail to completely explain their reasons for doing
so threaten the confidence that the American people have placed
in our nation's justice system. ' "
D. The Final Straw: Is Concurrence a Prerequisiteto Criminal
Liability?

A fundamental principle in criminal law is that a defendant's
to read a restaurant menu and paid the waitress before ordering food. Id.
The defendant later attempted to drive a car, but only proceeded a short distance
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

before he ran into a bush and overturned the car. Id. at 1313-14.
Id. at 1313.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1312.
Id. at 1313.
Weaver v. Indiana, 643 N.E.2d 342, 344 (Ind.1994).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 344-45; Weaver, 627 N.E.2d at 1313-14.
See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of the

problems that courts create when they fail to adequately justify their decision
to not hold an intoxicated defendant fully responsible for his actions.
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wrongful intent and criminal act must concur for a court to find a
defendant guilty.'8" Therefore, when a defendant asserts the voluntary intoxication defense he is in essence arguing that because
he had no mens rea to accompany his actus reus he is not criminally responsible.1"' However, courts may still convict a defendant
even though intoxication rendered him incapable of formulating
the requisite mental state during the commission of his criminal
act.8i 7 For instance, courts hold a defendant criminally liable when

a defendant formulates a criminal intent, becomes intoxicated, and
then commits a criminal act.'
If a defendant voluntarily consumes alcohol in order to give him the courage to commit a criminal act, that defendant is criminally liable.8 9 Thus, a court will
hold that defendant criminally liable if he formulated his criminal
intent prior to becoming inebriated.'"0
Courts must ignore the difference between criminal actors
who formulate a mens rea prior to becoming intoxicated and those
who decide to commit a crime after they are intoxicated; courts
must hold all intoxicated defendants completely liable for their
conduct. People know that alcohol tends to impair their ability to
make decisions.'
Therefore, courts must hold individuals accountable--especially those who know that they have a tendency to
commit crimes while drunk--for the consequences of becoming voluntarily intoxicated.'9 No court seeks to allow a defendant to
commit a crime with a gun in one hand and a bottle of beer in the
other with which to provide himself a defense. 9' Furthermore,
many jurisdictions recognize that a defendant has complete control
over his level of intoxication; therefore, jurisdictions hesitate to
allow the voluntary intoxication defense because it can be easily

185. HAWLEY & MCGREGOR, supra note 9, at 1. See also PHILLIP E.
JOHNSON, CRIMINAL LAW CASES, MATERIALS AND TExT 1 (1990) (stating that

most crimes require that a guilty mind accompany the guilty act).
186. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
necessity of a mens rea for criminal liability.
187. See, e.g., California v. Asher, 78 Cal. Rptr. 885, 899 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969)
(explaining that a defendant is criminally liable where he knowingly armed
himself, became intoxicated, and later murdered someone, even though intoxication impaired his ability to formulate a specific intent); Beshirs v. Oklahoma, 174 P. 577, 579 (Okla. Crim. App. 1918) (explaining that voluntary in-

toxication can provide a criminal actor with a defense only if he did not
formulate his criminal intent before he became intoxicated).
188. Asher, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
189. New York v. Krist, 60 N.E. 1057, 1061 (N.Y. 1901).

190. Asher, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 898.
191. South Carolina v. Vaughn, 232 S.E.2d 328, 331 (S.C. 1977) (stating that
people are aware that intoxicating liquors effect their ability to reason (citing
22 C.J.S. CriminalLaw § 66 (1961))).
192. Id.
193. Illinois v. Rosas, 429 N.E.2d 898, 900 (IM.App. Ct. 1982).
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fabricated."M Courts would best serve the goals of the criminal legal system if they were to expose intoxicated and drugged offenders to full criminal liability.'95
IV. PROPOSAL: A TWO PRONGED ATTACK ON THE PROBLEMS
ASSOCIATED WITH THE INTOXICATED CRIMINAL ACTOR

Jurisdictions that currently allow any form of the voluntary
intoxication defense must make vital changes in their criminal
laws to hold intoxicated criminal actors fully accountable for their
crimes.' The changes that jurisdictions must make are twofold.
Initially, jurisdictions must completely abolish the defense of voluntary intoxication.' The availability of this defense is unreasonable in light of the criminal law concepts of protecting the public
and holding defendants accountable for their actions."8 Furthermore, all jurisdictions should create legislation empowering courts
to hold an intoxicated criminal actor liable for voluntarily putting
himself into a situation where he had the potential to behave irresponsibly. For example in Germany, the criminal code provides
that "[w]hoever intentionally.., becomes intoxicated through the
use of alcohol or other intoxicating substances is punishable up to
five years in prison, if while in that intoxicated condition he commits a wrongful act and if by virtue of the intoxication is not responsible for that act."19
Legislation similar to this German law would enable courts to
punish drunken offenders without having to deal with the problems associated with an intoxicated mental state. At the same
time, such legislation preserves the requisite mens rea because a
defendant intentionally consumes alcohol. In addition, such legislation will have the effect of forcing people to think before they
drink.
194. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Rumsey, 454 A.2d 1121, 1124 (Pa. 1983)
(explaining that a defendant can easily, though falsely, claim the voluntary

intoxication defense because the severity of an actor's intoxicated state is
within his own control).
195. See KEILITZ & FULTON, supra note 16, at 5 (explaining that the goals of
the criminal law include "deterrence, rehabilitation, protection of the public

and retribution").
196. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535 (1968) (explaining that the idea

of personal accountability is a traditional common law concept).
197. See, e.g., Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013, 2019-20 n.2 (1996)
(noting that the following states had either outlawed or never enacted the
common law rule of allowing voluntary intoxication as a defense for specific
intent crimes: Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Mississippi,
South Carolina, and Texas).
198. See South Carolina v. Vaughn, 232 S.E.2d 328, 331 (S.C. 1977)
(commenting that the concept of personal responsibility lies at the foundation
of all law); KEILITZ & FULTON, supra note 16, at 5 (discussing that one of the
objectives of the criminal law is to afford protection to the public).
199. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw 847 (1978).
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This proposal is not an attempt to eliminate the traditional
criminal law concept of mens rea.2 Nor is this proposal suggesting
that states should relieve prosecutors of the burden of proving that
the defendant possessed the requisite mental state. The focus of
this proposal is to advocate personal accountability in the criminal
law. All defendants who assert the voluntary intoxication defense
have one thing in common: they have committed a criminal act yet
claim that because they were drunk they are not responsible for
their actions. Courts must ignore this claim and force these de-

fendants to be responsible for the crimes that they commit. 20
CONCLUSION
Courts that recognize the defense of voluntary intoxication
explain that alcohol affects a person's judgment and relaxes controls on anti-social impulses and aggression." While this is true,
people are aware of the effects that alcohol can have on their
judgment and ability to control themselves.2 2° Therefore, courts
must hold intoxicated individuals personally responsible for the
criminal acts that they commit. Courts must also consider the
hardships that victims suffer and impose liability on the party who
is in a better position to prevent injurious consequences.2 " The defendant is the party who can prevent injurious consequences with
his decision-making power to drink responsibly. Courts have de-

200. See LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 3, § 28, at 201 (discussing the necessity of mens rea as a prerequisite to criminal liability).
201. See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2020 (explaining that there are a number of
reasons to support the abolition of the defense of voluntary intoxication). For
example, holding intoxicated criminal actors fully responsible for their crimes
promotes responsible drinking and generally discourages intoxication. Id. In
addition, disallowing the defense provides courts with the ability to specifically punish individuals who commit crimes while intoxicated. Id. The Court
also explained that states that disallow the voluntary intoxication defense are
acting consistently with the morals of society which dictate that a person who
chooses to become intoxicated must be accountable for his actions. Id.
202. See California v. Hood, 462 P.2d 370, 379 (Cal. 1969) (explaining that
an intoxicated person cannot contemplate the social ramifications of his actions or control aggressive impulses as well as a sober person).
203. See Pennsylvania v. Rumsey, 454 A.2d 1121, 1124 (Pa. 1983)
(explaining that some inexperienced individuals are unable to anticipate how
drugs or alcohol will effect them). In these types of situations, however,
courts can use their discretion to impose lesser sentences to remedy any unfairness. Id.
204 Id. In Rumsey, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania explained that intoxicated persons commit almost half of the reported violent crimes in Pennsylvania. Id. The court further explained that this demonstrates that the
hardships that victims suffer at the hands of intoxicated offenders is considerable. Id. The Rumsey court concluded that courts must hold responsible
those individuals who have a better opportunity to prevent others from being
injured. Id.
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signed the law to protect the freedom of individuals." At the same
time, states must mandate that with this freedom comes responsibility. In order to ensure the weal of the body politic and the
going concern of our nation, society must no longer accept this
easily fabricated defense for criminal conduct.

205. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 701 (1975) (explaining that the
criminal law is slanted in favor of protecting a defendant's freedom).

